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Abstract 
The paper offers a chronology of financial crises in Norway from her independence in 
1814 till present times. Firstly, business cycles, covering almost two hundred years of 
economic history are mapped. These reveal years of crises in the real economy. These 
seem to coincide with most of the major financial crises. Secondly, the paper the 
financial crises are described chronologically. Thirdly, the paper investigates key 
patterns in credit and money volumes. It concludes that major financial crises 
typically took place after substantial money and credit expansion causing financial 
instability, loss of long term equilibriums, overheating and bubbles followed by 
severe meltdowns in the economy. 
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Introduction 
During the summer 2007 the world economy faced severe financial difficulties, 
mirrored in turn of peaked business cycles, falling real estate markets, and lack of 
confidence in the credit sector, which seemed to have over expanded due to high 
gearing of the economy. Thereafter, the world economy went into a global recession 
accompanied by real estate market and stock market crashes. The speed of the global 
meltdown during the summer and the autumn of 2008, was higher than during the 
Great Depression in the early 1930s.1 Some of the most important banks in the US 
and Europe failed and the markets panicked. Inter-bank markets collapsed and even 
solid banks ran out of liquidity. 
 The crisis also hit the Norway. However, given the smallness and openness of 
her economy, most economists are surprised by the relatively modest impact of the 
huge international problems on the Norwegian economy. When out three neighboring 
countries Denmark, Finland and Sweden have experienced twelve months fall in total 
output reported in the second quarter of 2009 of 5.5, 6.4 and 9.4 per cent, the 
Norwegian fall has been limited to 2.2 per cent.2 Also the financial markets seem to 
tackle the crisis better in Norway than most other Western countries.   
 The good Norwegian performance has not been a general trend during 
financial crises. From its independence in May 1814 till present days Norway has 
seen nine major financial crises and several smaller domestic and regional crises. 
Most of these nine busts have been international crises naturally hitting the small open 
Norwegian economy hard. We also find examples of financial crashes with limited 
impact on the real economy. These are normally stock market crashes. Norway had its 
biggest stock market crash ever from May 1918 to February 1923, with a 73.6 per 
cent fall in the main index at Oslo Stock Exchange. The great bulk of this fall came at 
the same time as the largest boom ever recorded in the Norwegian economy in 1919 
until late summer 1920. There were also significant stock market crashes along with 
the Asia-crisis in 1998 and the dot.com-crisis after the turn of the twentieth century, 
without having any crises in the real Norwegian economy.3 
 
                                                 
1 Eichengreen, Barry and Kevin O’Rourke, “A tale of two depressions”, URL: 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3421 
2 Eurostat and OECD, URL: http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=350 
3 Klovland, Jan T., “Historical stock price indices in Norway 1914-2003”, Eitrheim, Øyvind, Jan T. 
Klovland and Jan F. Qvigstad (eds), Historical Monetary Statistics for Norway 1819-2003, Occasional 
Papers No 35, Norges Bank, Oslo 2004, 329-348. 
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Task of paper 
International academic experts on financial crises, like Hyman Minsky, Charles P. 
Kindleberger and Robert Z. Aliber argue that the way to financial crises most 
commonly go through financial instability in different phases.4 In the first place 
markets loose their long-term equilibrium through significant shocks making the 
economy run faster. Positive expectations make the demand for credits increase. 
Financial stability is lost and credit bubbles arise. In consequence, the economy will 
be over heated and asset bubbles are created. When the markets turn it is likely to 
experience credit crunch, asset crashes and recessions.5  
 In this paper we seek to find general development trends before and during 
financial crises in Norway, from her independence from Denmark in may 1814 until 
present days. Hence, we will look at key aggregates in the money and credit markets 
and at price developments for assets and for the economy in general. A central 
question is to what extent considerable financial crises, lasting for some time, have 
had on the Norwegian real economy.  
 In the present paper we first define the concept of financial crises as we see 
them here. Next we will give a brief overview of business cycles in Norway from she 
gained her independence from Danish rule in 1814 till present. This is basically done 
by drawing on gross domestic product data constructed as part of a project on 
Historical Monetary Statistics monitored by the Norwegian central bank. By doing 
this we find the pattern of the real economy during financial crises. Thereafter, the 
nine major financial crises in Norway from 1814 till present are described and 
discussed. Finally, the paper deals with the two key financial aggregates money stock 
and bank loans in order to find their relevance as explanatory variables in conjunction 
with Minsky’s and Kindleberger’s theories of financial crises.  
 
Definitions 
A first step on the road to the mapping and understanding of financial crises is to 
define the concept. The term financial crisis broadly applies to a variety of situations, 
when financial institutions or assets rapidly lose significant parts of their value. A 
                                                 
4 Minsky, Hyman, “The financial instability hypothesis: Capitalistic process and the behaviour of the 
economy”, Kindleberger, Charles P. and J.-P. Laffargue (eds), Financial Crises: Theory, History and 
Policy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1982, 13-29 and Kindleberger, Charles P. and Robert 
Z. Aliber, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, Palgrave, New York 2005, 21-
32. 
5 Kindleberger, Charles P. and Robert Z. Aliber, Manias, Panics and Crashes, 33-76. 
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leading international authority in research on this issue, Professor Raymond 
Goldsmith, defines a financial crisis as:6  
 
"a sharp, brief, ultra-cyclical deterioration of almost all financial indicators, short-
term interest rates, assets (stock, real estate, land) prices, commercial insolvencies 
and failure of financial institutions."  
 
Another international authority in the area, Professor Charles P. Kindleberger, defines 
financial crises as successions of several phases: exogenous shocks, speculative 
manias (with euphoria, overtrading, and excessive gearing), financial distress, and 
finally disastrous meltdown of the economy.7 During the 19th and the first part of the 
20th centuries, financial crises were basically associated with bank panics and credit 
crunches. Recessions often coincided with these panics. Other situations, often 
considered financial crises, include stock market crashes, bursting of financial 
bubbles, currency crises, and sovereign defaults.  
 Drawing on established definitions we here define a financial crises as 
significant falls in financial market. The fall has to be substantially worse than a 
normal correction. It makes markets shrink through negative psychology and low 
expectations, making the credit market work irrational by not providing necessary 
credit in order to make the economy work efficiently. 
 
Mapping of business cycles 
Financial turmoil do not necessary have to go together with downturns in the real 
economy. This can be illustrated with the state of the Norwegian economy in 1919-
1920. During these years Norway experienced both the highest growth rates and the 
worst stock market crash ever recorded. It is therefore of interest to map the historical 
relationship of financial crises and business cycles. 
 In order to map historical business cycles we need output figures. In 2004 an 
annual time series of gross domestic product was published by the central bank. The 
series stretches back to 1830, and provides information on both the production and the 
expenditure side of the economy. These are constructed on the basis of a wide range 
                                                 
6 Goldsmith, Raymond W., The National Balance Sheet of the United States, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, University of Chicago Press, 1982.   
7 Kindleberger, Charles P. and Robert Z. Aliber, Manias, Panics and Crashes, 1-20. 
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of data, collected from Statistics Norway, regional reports given by public servants, 
the National Archive, regional archives, business archives and the Wedervang 
Archive on wages and prices kept at the Norwegian School of Economics and 
Business Administration.8 
  
Chart 1. GDP for Norway 1830-2010 in 2000-NOK. (Prognosis for 2009-2010). 
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Source, Grytten, Ola H., “The gross domestic product for Norway 1830-2003”, 277-280 and Statistics Norway. 
 
 
Chart 1 reports GDP per capita volumes for Norway 1830-2008. As we can see from 
the graph this was basically a period of economic growth. However, the curve also 
reveals some turbulence, in particular during and around the two world wars. 
 By looking at the first order differentials, i.e. annual relative changes in per 
capita GDP, we get a better glimpse of good and bad years in the economy, as shown 
in chart 2. In order to look at more than annual cycles, we have also calculated five-
year symmetric smoothed averages. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Grytten, Ola H., “The gross domestic product for Norway 1830-2003”, Eitrheim, Øyvind, Jan T. 
Klovland and Jan F. Qvigstad (eds), Historical Monetary Statistics for Norway 1819-2003, Occasional 
Papers No 35, Norges Bank, Oslo 2004, 241-288. 
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Chart 2. First order differentials in GDP for Norway 1830-2010 in 2000-NOK.  
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Source, Grytten, Ola H., “The gross domestic product for Norway 1830-2003”, 277-280 and Statistics Norway. 
 
 
Still, by making the time series more stationary we can supplement our findings on 
business cycles. Here we use a Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP-filter). The HP-filter is an 
algorithm for finding smoothed values, i,e, trends, of a time series. The filter separates 
an observed time series, here GDP per capita, yt, into a smoothed or a trend 
component, tt, and a cyclical component, ct, as stated in equation (1): 
 
 (1)      yt = tt + ct  
 
 
The cyclical component will here be a measure of the strength of the business cycle. 
The relative strength of the business cycle can, thus, be found by dividing the 
observed values by the trend component as stated in equation (2): 
 
(2)     ct = log yt − log tt  
 
According to this equation the stationary trend will be equal to zero and the cyclical 
component will fluctuate around this value. The objective function of the filtered 
series will have the form stated in (3): 
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(3)   min ct
2 +λ ((tt+1 − tt )− (tt − tt−1 ))2
t=2
m−1∑
t=1
m∑  
 
Here m is the number of samples and λ is the smoothing parameter, specifying the 
smoothness of the trend. The normal λ-value for annual data is set to 100, 1,600 for 
quarterly data and 14,400 for monthly data. It is argued in analyses of Norwegian 
business cycles that a valid λ for quarterly GDP-figures is around 40,000. That is 25 
times higher than the standard λ=100. In our analysis we lack quarterly data previous 
to the 1970s. Thus, annual figures are used here. Hence, we apply both the standard 
λ=100 and λ=2,500 in our analysis. The latter gives a smoother trend and clearer 
cycles. Also, it makes potential end-point errors smaller. The business cycles, 
calculated as relative deviations from the HP-filtered trends are reported in chart 3. 
   
Chart 3. Output gaps as cycle deviations from HP-filtered trend 1830-2010. 
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Source, Grytten, Ola H., “The gross domestic product for Norway 1830-2003”, 277-280 and Statistics Norway. 
 
 
On the basis of these graphs and we can point out nine major crises in the real 
economy in peacetime. All these coincide with major financial crises. This analysis 
confirms the views made by Kindleberger and Goldsmith, i.e. financial turmoil often 
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comes together with heavy downturns in the business cycle.9 In table 1 below we 
illustrate the strength of the recessions during these financial crises. In the table we 
report maximum negative cycle values for both λ=100 and λ=2,500 on our annual 
data. We also report the change in per capita GDP from the top to the bottom years.  
 In order to illustrate the strength of the recessions we also report standard 
deviations from the mean values for sub-periods. The first sub-period, 1830-1914, 
covers the independent growing Norwegian economy under a liberal era. The second 
period is the turbulent inter-war period of both severe crises and considerable 
economic growth. The final period stretches from the post World War 1 period, more 
precisely 1946, till present days, inclusive prognoses for 2009 and 2010.10 
  
Table 1. Strength of Norwegian business cycles. 
Crisis 
 
Cycle value 
 
Bottom 
year 
Cycle value 
 
Bottom 
year 
GDPc change 
 
Bottom 
year 
        
1814-1839 -0.0585 1832 -0.0560 1831 -0.0810 1831 
  (2.1017)  (1.5861)  (3.1228)  
1847-1850 -0.0648 1848 -0.0761 1848 -0.0938 1848 
  (2.3297)  (2.1576)  (3.5464)  
1856-1861 -0.0510 1861 -0.0711 1861 -0.0763 1857 
  (1.8341)  (2.0144)  (2.9704)  
1875-1888 -0.0329 1887 -0.0443 1887 -0.0569 1879 
  (1.1836)  (1.2568)  (2.3273)  
1899-1905 -0.0440 1905 -0.0605 1905 -0.0139 1904 
  (1.5818)  (1.7158)  (0.9102)  
Stdev 1830-1914 0.0278  0.0353  -0.0167  
        
1920-1928 -0.0735 1921 -0.0933 1921 -0.1082 1921 
  (1.6150)  (1.6442)  (2.5702)  
1930-1933 -0.0369 1931 0.0018 1931 -0.0835 1931 
  (0.8117)  (0.0324)  (2.1315)  
Stdev 1919-1939 0.0455  0.0568  -0.0199  
        
1987-1993 -0.0301 1993 -0.0408 1933 -0.0071 1988 
  (1.5614)  (1.5710)  (1.7557)  
2007-2010 -0.0222 2010 -0.0393 2010 -0.0220 2009 
  (1.1530)  (1.5130)  (2.4345)  
Stdev 1946-2010 0.0193  0.0259  0.0095  
        
Source, Grytten, Ola H., “The gross domestic product for Norway 1830-2003”, 277-280 and Statistics Norway. 
The numbers in brackets report the size of the negative cycle or GDP per capita fall relative to standard deviations 
from mean values 
                                                 
9 Kindleberger, Charles P. and Robert Z. Aliber, Manias, panics and crashes, 1-20. 
10 Grytten, Ola H., “The economic history of Norway”. 
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Table 1 shows that the recessions were significant during all the nine financial crises. 
In some cases, e.g. the 1899-1905-crisis, we see that the fall in GDP per capita was 
smaller than the standard deviation from mean value. However, GDP stayed at a low 
level for several years, and, thus, the cycle values were quite low. As for other cases, 
e.g. the Great Depression of the 1930s, the filtered trends are not representative for 
the real development due to heavy turbulence during both the 1920s and World War 
II. Hence, the negative cycle is underestimated. However, the fall in GDP from top to 
bottom was more than 2.1 times higher than the standard deviation for the period. 
 
Account of financial crises in Norway 
In this section of the paper we will give a short overview of the most devastating 
financial crises in the Norwegian economy from the dependence from Denmark in 
May 1814 until present days. Arguably, there have been more than nine such crises. 
However, it is a matter of debate when problematic markets should be referred to as 
crises. According to our definition the problems have to be significantly worse than 
during normal market corrections. We have chosen the crises, which historically seem 
to have had the largest negative impact on the business community, such as they are 
described by writers on Norwegian financial and economic history.11 
 
The Post-Napoleonic Crisis 
In May 1814 Norwegian gained independence after more than 400 years under 
Danish rule. It started in tragic ways. In the first place, the country was forced into a 
personnel union under the Swedish king until 1905. Secondly, monetary chaos and 
huge deficits brought the new state into a deep financial crisis, which was not solved 
properly before 1842.12 During this period the economy saw booms and busts. 
International panics occurred in 1819 and 1837. As for Norway, lack of financial 
stability, currency difficulties and insufficient credits existed for most of the period. 
 The Danish king decided to stick to neutrality during the Napoleonic wars. 
This was an art of balancing as both the French and the British and their allied 
accused Denmark-Norway for taking side both politically and economically. From 
                                                 
11 Grytten, Ola H., “The economic history of Norway”, URL: 
http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/grytten.norway 
12 Eitrheim, Øyvind, “Fra Peder Anker til stabilitet i pengevesenet”, Eitrheim, Øyvind og Jan F. 
Qvigstad (eds), Tilbakeblikk på norsk pengehistorie, Occasional papers No 37, Norges Bank, Oslo, 1-
18. 
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January 1st France started a total blockade of the United Kingdom, and demanded the 
Danish king to take part in this policy. Britain fared that Napoleon would gain control 
over the Danish-Norwegian fleet, which was one of the most important fleets in 
Europe of that time. Thus, they decided to act quickly and by surprise. In August 
1814 an armada of 434 British vessels patrolled the seas around Copenhagen, 
demanding to borrow the Danish-Norwegian fleet until the war was over. After heavy 
bombardment, the Danish king surrendered and 79 fully equipped naval and merchant 
vessels were taken by the British. 
 This made the Danish king take the French side in the war. Hence, Norway 
involuntarily became the enemy of the United Kingdom. A blockade was set up to 
prevent goods being transported to and from Norwegian ports. Norway was left to 
itself. The money supply, which was already very high, was increased dramatically 
for financial purposes. This made product demand increase at the same time as supply 
decreased.13 As result, inflation gained pace as money depreciated rapidly. During the 
fall of 1813 the Rigssdaler had depreciated with more than 99 per cent. Two attempts 
at stabilizing the currency failed within 1816. Inflation rates reached more than 150 
per cent in 1812.14 
 After independence from Denmark, Norway had to set up her own institutions, 
including her own monetary system. The central bank was set up by law from 1816. It 
gained issuing monopoly from the start. Norway adopted a silver standard with the 
speciedaler as key currency. However, due to high inflation, monetary chaos and lack 
of confidence in the new state, it took 26 years before the daler gained redemption to 
par silver value in April 1843. In order to pa back international depths of depths and 
establish necessary capital both for the state and the central bank, Norway had to take 
up loan with high risk premium abroad. The domestic financial system was dependent 
on the central bank, which also acted as the only inland commercial bank until 1848. 
The bank was forced to run a careful monetary policy in order to reach par value of 
the daler. Thus, domestic credit was scarce and international credit expensive. As 
result, the Norwegian economy went into stagnation, which lasted until the end of the 
1830s. 
 
                                                 
13 Hodne, Fritz and Ola H. Grytten, Norsk økonomi i det 19. århundre, Fagbokforlaget, Bergen 2000, 
21-34. 
14 Eitrheim, Øyvind, “Fra Peder Anker til stabilitet i pengevesenet”, 12-13. 
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The 1848 Crisis 
The next significant financial crisis took place around the European revolutionary 
year 1848. From the mid 1840s towards the end of the decade continental Europe 
experienced a huge increase in prices on crops and potatoes. This was due to both 
supply side and demand side shocks in the economy. In the first place, several years 
of bad harvest made prices step up significantly. Secondly, the Corn Laws, protecting 
domestic producers, were abandoned in the UK, and thus a substantial increase in 
demand for crops in international markets took place. European convergence of 
agricultural prices gained pace. In consequence, from early 1845 till the spring of 
1847 prices on rye and wheat in big European continental cities doubled. Still 
working class families still used 50 per cent or more of their income on food and 
other agricultural products in most European countries.15 With increasing prices on 
price inelastic products as food, they had to reduce their demand of industrial 
products. Hence, the industrial sector experienced a negative demand shock, leading 
to insolvencies, bankruptcies and a credit crisis.  
 The problems strongly contributed to political discontentment and a 
revolutionary wave sweeping over continental Europe. In France the monarchy was 
abolished under the February revolution of 1848. Upraises took place in Italy, 
Austria-Hungary and Prussia. Uncertainty increased. International trade decreased 
and the financial markets struggled with lack of trust and liquidity. In Austria-
Hungary the monarchy did not manage to gain full control until 1851, when the 
monarchy was reestablished in 1852 in France.16  
 In Norway lack of confidence in the speciedaler led to a fall in the silver 
reserves kept by the central bank from 1846 onwards. To avoid over issuing of 
money, the central bank had to issue less notes. The negative shift in international 
demand caused exports to fall and the silver reserves to shrink even more. Thus, the 
monetary policy had to become even tighter. Increasing lack of confidence to the 
Norwegian currency during the international financial crisis made the situation even 
worse, as the market sold bought silver for the daler.17 Thus, the contraction spiral in 
the money market continued. In consequence domestic demand also failed and 
                                                 
15 Merriman, John, A History of Modern Europe: From the Renaissance to the Present. W.W. Norton, 
New York, 1996, 718-724. 
16 Tocqueville, Alexis de 1893. Recollections: The French Revolution of 1848. Doubleday, Garden 
City NY 1970, 98 and Bideleux, Robert and Ian Jeffries, A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and 
Change, Routledge, London 1998, 295-296. 
17 Rygg, Nicolai, Norges Banks historie, vol I, Norges Bank, Kristiania 1918, 289-308. 
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economic activity fell substantially. In order to avoid further escape of capital, silver 
redemption was expelled in the central bank’s regional offices in Bergen and Oslo, 
when the interest rates were raised at the head quarters in Trondheim.18 Credit granted 
was radically reduced. Thus, economic activity suffered even more and insolvencies 
and bankruptcies became daily affairs.  
 The problems ended after the government got a loan of 0.6 million speciedaler 
in London and thereafter a 1.5 million speciedaler long-term loan at Hambo’s in 
Denmark. The ministry of finance distributed the credit through governmental 
commissions.19 1849 was the last crucial year of crisis. However, the shock waves 
influenced had their impact on the Norwegian economy for another couple of years.  
 
The Crimean Crisis 
Another severe financial crisis hit the world economy after the Crimean War October 
1853 - February 1856. The war was fought between Russia on the one side and an 
alliance of the United Kingdom, France, the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of 
Sardinia and on the other. The conflict was officially triggered by conflicts of 
interests of control over the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. However, the underlying 
real reason for the war was the long-running contest between the major European 
powers for influence over territories of the declining Ottoman Empire. Most of the 
battle took place on the Crimean Peninsula, which the Russians had conquered from 
the Ottomans in 1774 and annexed in 1785. Additionally, there were smaller 
campaigns in West Turkey, the Baltic Sea, the Pacific Ocean and the White Sea. 
 The immediate impact of the war on the international economy was chiefly 
positive, and as a small open economy Norway experienced favorable years. The 
demand for services by the Norwegian merchant fleet stepped up and the freight rates 
increased substantially.20 The upheaval came together with a new gold rush in 
California, also fueling the world economy. The growth in business activity was to a 
large extent financed by growth in short-term credits. Speculative bubbles were born 
due to high expectations of increasing prices on assets, export and import goods.21 In 
                                                 
18 Hodne, Fritz and Ola H. Grytten, Norsk økonomi i det 19. århundre, 216-217. 
19 Parliament Proposition No 43 1890. 
20 Klovland, Jan T., “New evidence on the causes of the fluctuations in ocean freight rates in the 
1850s”,  Explorations in Economic History, vol 46, 2009, 266-284. 
21 Calomiris, Charles W. and Larry Schweikart, "The panic of 1857: Origins, transmission, and 
containment". Journal of Economic History, vol 51, No. 4, 1991, 807–834. 
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Scandinavia, Bergen became a centre of speculation in prices on crops and freight 
rates. Substantial parts of this speculation were financed by short-term credits. 
 After the war, pries fell considerably. Speculators ran into heavy losses. Ship 
owners and importers with large stocks of rye and wheat from the Black sea became 
losers, as they had traded at very high market prices, which fell dramatically. In 
Bergen alone 88 traders and investors went bankrupt between 1856 and 1859. 22  
 During the first stage of the crisis many Norwegian merchants and investors 
were saved by blanco credits granted in Hamburg and London. However, when an 
international finance crisis started its global spread from New York during the spring 
of 1857, London and Hamburg, along with other financial centers, were hit 
devastatingly. Almost 60 per cent of the most important short-term creditors for 
Norwegian companies in Hamburg had to cease their activities. Other creditors 
demanded rapid cash redemption of their loans to Norwegian merchants, investors 
and manufacturers. By the spring of 1857 the crisis had reached the capital Christiania 
and all other significant Norwegian cities. Besides a serious credit crunch real estate 
prices stagnated after a booming decade.  
 The Norwegian government, the trade and employers association, Handelens 
Venner, and the new established major bank, Den norske Creditbank, joined forces in 
order to avoid financial panics and a total stop in the credit market. Guaranties were 
give, and 320 foreign creditors with claims on 900 Norwegian companies were paid 
the equivalent of 1.65 million speciedaler. In 1858 the parliament approved a loan 
from Hambro & Son, London of 3.6 million speciedaler in foreign currency. During 
the late summer 1858 most of the financial difficulties ceased in Christiania, when the 
problems lasted for another two years in Bergen.23 The negative effects on industrial 
output lagged somewhat from the financial markets and probably reached its 
minimum during winter 1860-1861. House prices stagnated in the late phase of the 
crisis, and fell until 1862. 
 
The long depression  
The long depression reflects a series of downturns in output along with a deflationary 
tendency in the world economy from the mid 1870s until the early 1890s. It saw 
                                                 
22 Hodne, Fritz and Ola H. Grytten, Norsk økonomi i det 19. århundre, 167-168. 
23 Seip, Jens Arup, “Saint Simon, Credit Mobilier og Den norske Creditbank”, Historisk tidsskrift, vol 
36, 1957, 513-538. 
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several international financial panics, e.g. in 1893 and in 1882, which strongly 
contributed to the contraction. The depression hit harder in the United Kingdom and 
in economies dependent on their markets than in most other countries and is often 
seen as part of the relative British decline during the last decades of the nineteenth 
century.24 As a small and open economy, heavy dependent on trade with the United 
Kingdom, Norway suffered considerably from this crisis as the per capita real GDP 
level from the top year 1876 was not regained before 1888.25 Deflation was severe 
and it took prices 38 years to come back to their peak 1874-level.26 Additionally, the 
early adoption of gold, late industrialization and transformation from sailing to steam 
in the merchant fleet are explanatory variables for the deep crisis in Norway in the 
second half of the 1870s and most of the 1880s. 
 According to Norwegian county reports the economy had a strong boom 1871-
1873 with “fairytale” profits. Then, during 1874 and 1875, a clear reaction and 
correction was reported to be under its way. Huge public investment and favorable 
harvests in agriculture and fisheries made 1876 the peak year of GDP. The situation in 
the early 1870s clearly was one of a booming economy with bubble tendencies and 
high investment rates prolonged by good harvests.  
 The international economy was running fast under British leadership. Credits 
were given at low interest rates and the monetary expansion was substantial. In July 
1869 the key interest rate of the central bank was 5.65 per cent. During the following 
boom and financial expansion it stabilized below four per cent for a long period of 
time in 1871-1873.27 From January 1869 till January 1874 money supply increased 
with more than 53 percent.28 These years made up a huge contrast to the depression 
years to come. According to business cycles research Norway experienced two 
                                                 
24 Musson, A.E., "The Great Depression in Britain, 1873-1896: A Reappraisal". The Journal of 
Economic History, vol 19, No 2, 1959, 199–228 and Davis, Joseph, "An Improved Annual Chronology 
of U.S.; Business Cycles since the 1790s". The Journal of Economic History, vol 66, No. 1, 2006, 103–
21. 
25 Grytten, Ola H., “The gross domestic product for Norway 1830-2003”, 241-288. 
26 Grytten, Ola H., “A Norwegian consumer price index 1819–1913 in a Scandinavian perspective”, 
European Review of Economic History, vol 8, 2004, 61-79. 
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significant contractions from 1876 till 1879 and from late 1887 till late 1888. In 
addition there was a milder downturn from late 1882 till January 1887.29 
 Both the boom and the contraction were to a large degree imported from the 
world’s leading economy and Norway’s most important trading partner, the United 
Kingdom. Bad years caused Britain to import less timber, fish and freight services 
from the merchant fleet. Thus, all the three most important Norwegian export 
industries were severely hit. Norway, Denmark and Sweden also adopted the gold 
standard earlier than most other countries, in January 1874. The international adoption 
of gold gave a considerable increase in the international demand for gold. Thus, gold 
currencies appreciated relative to silver currencies. In consequence, they lost 
competitive power and negative capital movements took place. In order to protect the 
krone interest rates were raised from 3.5 to 7.0 per cent between 1872 and 1877. From 
January 1874 to January 1879 money supply contracted almost 28 per cent. 
 Another important reason for the bad performance in Norway was the late 
transition from sail to steam vessels in the merchant fleet.30 Norway had specialized 
in transporting timber and wooden products on sailing vessels within the British 
Empire. Substantial capital was invested in vessels constructed for this kind of trade. 
When British and continental imports of timber was reduced during the downturn of 
the business cycle, the Norwegian merchant fleet suffered devastatingly. Several 
banks went bankrupt, particularly in the Agder-area in the very south of the country, 
where the merchant fleet was the dominant factor in business life. In Arendal, the 
second biggest city in the area, three out of four banks went bankrupt during the 
financial crash in 1886.31 The population level in the south stagnated and did not 
reach its 1875 level until 1930. This made the transition over to more competitive 
steam vessels even more difficult and further delayed the process. Belgium’s steam 
tonnage surpassed the sailing tonnage in 1878. The same happened for the United 
Kingdom in 1883, Germany in 1884-1885, Denmark in 1893 and Sweden in 1900. As 
for Norway steam became dominant in 1907. From the late 1870s until 1912 the 
Norwegian share of the world merchant fleet sank by more than one third.  
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The Kristiania Crisis 
The next considerable financial crisis took place from the fall of 1899 and lasted until 
1905. It was a combination of a credit and private estate crisis with effects on the real 
economy. The money, credit and private estate markets lost their financial stability 
during a strong expansion period in the 1890s. Financial bubbles were created and 
crashed rapidly during the last part of 1899 and in the next years to come.  
 An initial reason for the creation of bubbles ending in severe financial crashes 
was an important change in monetary policy in 1893. When the gold standard was 
introduced in January 1874 parliament had decided to maintain the cvotient-system 
from the silver standard prior to 1874. According to this system there had to be a 
minimum relation between metal reserves controlled by the central bank and the 
volume of issued notes. This cvotient was set to 2:5.32 The system was pro-cyclic, as 
the central bank had ran deflationary monetary policy in times of low metal coverage. 
This pro-cyclic system in fact made the long depression deeper than necessary.  
 The rule was abandoned in 1893, and the difference system was introduced. 
According to this system parliament could decide excess note issuing, independent of 
metal coverage. This made way for an expansionary monetary policy with low 
interest rates and money and credit expansion. At the same time agriculture saw rapid 
growth in productivity, and labor was transferred to fast growing manufacturing 
industry in urban areas.33 From 1890 till 1899 the population of Kristiania alone 
stepped up by 47 per cent.       
 The demand for dwellings and commercial buildings increased dramatically. 
New buildings were financed by cheap credits. In February 1894 money supply (M0) 
was 53.8 million NOK. In September 1899 it had increased to 86.7 million, an 
increase of more than 61 per cent during five and a half year.34 Wages stepped up 
substantially in Kristiania and the other main cities. House prices increased with 73 
per cent 1895-1899 in the capital and 40 percent in Bergen 1894-1898.35  
 The expansion in the private estate market was basically organized by stock 
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emiisions. Emissions in new companies in Kristiania were doubled 1897-1899.36 Six 
new commercial banks were established in the city between 1896 and 1898. They 
specialized in lending money on projects with stocks as security and third priority 
loans to house-building companies. All of these banks went bankrupt during the 
following asset crash.  
 During the winter season 1898-1899 markets became nervous, and it became 
increasingly more evident that market prices on assets were very high. During 1899 
the bubbles crashed. Prices on both commercial buildings and dwellings fell 
considerably. Dwellings fell as much as 59 per cent in Kristiania 1899-1904 and 43 
per cent in Bergen 1898-1905. The annual number of bankruptcies in Norway stepped 
up from 241 in 1890 to 736 in 1903. 37 Heavy losses made banks collapse. The crisis 
in the real estate and the financial markets continued until 1905. Bank losses were 
high and the economy stagnated.    
 
The post-war depression 
When the Kristiania crisis was a domestic happening, the crisis of the 1920s was an 
international downturn. However, in Norway it was made harder and even sustained 
by pro-cyclical monetary policy. At the start of World War I Norway, like the other 
economies of the world suspended gold redemption of its currency. In order to 
maintain demand and finance the costs of war, both neutral and involved countries ran 
expansionary monetary policy. The agenda was low central bank rents, high credits 
and heavy budget deficits. Central bank rates were set down, credits were increased 
and heavy budget deficits existed.38  
 The money stock stepped up by a factor of five in Norway 1914-1920. Thus, 
demand shifted outwards due to monetary extension, when supply shifted inwards due 
to lack of supply during the war. Thus, consumer price inflation rocketed with 207 per 
cent and gross sale inflation with 317 per cent from the outbreak of the war till late 
summer 1920. The krone depreciated with 50 per cent to gold from the late phase of 
the war until the autumn of 1920.39 Real interest rates in Norway came down to under 
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30 per cent. In consequence, saving was low and investments high, given the stressed 
market situation. 
 Accumulation of money led to a short and hectic boom when supply was 
released after the war until late summer 1920. Investments increased with 34 percent 
in two years from 1918 until 1920. Imports into Norway became more than twice as 
high as exports in 1919.40 Finally, during the late summer and Autumn of 1920 both 
domestic and international markets turned rapidly.  
 Along with the international recession, the Norwegian central bank decided to 
adopt a deflationary monetary policy in order to bring the krone back to its par value 
in gold. Thus, the krone had to appreciate by 100 per cent. The deflationary policy 
was monitored in to phases. The first started in the autumn of 1920 with increasing 
interest rates and lower volumes of credit granted from the central bank. During the 
first months the krone appreciated considerably. However, this development was not 
steady and the krone started to fluctuate substantially.  
 The international crisis along with the tight monetary policy led to huge 
financial problems. As strong inflation turned to hard deflation and nominal interest 
rates were set up, real interest rates peaked at close to 40 per cent in the early 1920s. 
Investments were reduced to a half, unemployment rates and bankruptcies were 
recorded at all time high levels as both of them were multiplied by a factor close to 
seven from 1919 until 1926. Bank failures reached seven per cent of GDP in 1923 and 
1925, by far the highest losses ever in Norway. Hence, the central bank was forced by 
the depressed market situation to bring the deflationary monetary policy to a pause 
during the spring of 1923.41 
 Foreign trade revived, and the heavy deficits ceased. Unemployment and 
financial losses fell. This gave way to a new period of deflationary policy, at the same 
time as the world economy performed far better. A new round of deflationary policy 
was introduced, and from late 1924 until may 1928, the Norwegian krone regained its 
par value in gold. The price had been a devastating financial crisis, with stagnent 
GDP, investments and foreign trade, deflation, more than a hundred bank failures and 
economy wide unemployment rates reaching more than eight per cent on an annual 
basis in 1926 and 1927. The depression of the 1920s stands out as the worst financial 
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crisis recorded in Norway. According to national accounts only Britain was hit harder 
in the early 1920s, when Norway performed even worse than her in the mid-1920s. 
 
The great depression 
Despite huge financial crises in the interwar period, both the Norwegian and the 
international economy saw periods of very high growth between the hard years. From 
the late 1920s, Norway took part in a significant international boom. From 1929 this 
was turned into the strongest global depression recorded in modern history ever. The 
international downturn started after the overheated economy with strong asset bubbles 
collapsed in the US from October 1929.  
 International financial instability gave huge capital inflow to the US and France 
in the 1920s. One source was war reparations paid by Germany to France and 
Belgium, another was inter-allied depth paid from European allied powers to the US. 
In addition both the US and France had under valued currencies and were 
protectionists. In consequence the two powers accumulated capital, when most of 
Europe lost their liquidity and were dependent on short-term credits granted by 
American banks. 
 The money and credit expansions during the “happy 20s” were reversed by 
contractions after October 1929. The New York Stock exchange fell by 86 per cent 
until the summer of 1933. GDP per capita fell by more than 30 per cent in North-
America, and by 15-17 percent globally.42 US banks were not able to renew their 
credits to Europe as almost 10 000 of them went bankruptcy, when another 14 000 
needed public protection. With 95 per cent of American banks in liquidity shortage, 
the problems were transmitted to Europe, which saw currency crises in 1930 -1931.43 
 When the crisis of the 1920s was harder in Norway than in most other countries, 
the depression of the 1930s was milder. This also applies for the United Kingdom and 
the Nordic countries, except for Sweden.44 The relative success is best explained by 
the early abandonment of gold in these countries in September and October 1931. 
Hence, they were able to monitor a less tight and more inflationary monetary policy 
than many other countries. This gave fuel to a less devastating recession, a milder 
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deflation and a earlier and more rapid recovery.  
 However, as a small open economy Norway suffered from the international melt 
down from the summer of 1930. In 1931 exports and manufacturing output fell by 12 
and 22.5 percent respectively, when investments contracted with 28.4 percent 1930-
1932. Total unemployment came close to eleven per cent in 1933.45 In sum, consumer 
prices fell by 54.2 percent from late 1920 until early 1934. However, the banking 
system survived the crisis of the 1930s far better than in almost any capitalist country. 
This can be explained by the early abandonment of gold, active central bank policy 
and careful banks.46 
 The depression in Norway reached its turning point in December 1932, a few 
months later than in the UK.47 The recovery was rapid. However, unemployment 
stayed persistently high until 1941, despite considerable growth in employment.  
 
The banking crisis 1987-1993 
After World War II, credit markets were significantly more regulated than previously, 
both domestically and internationally. An important goal for Norwegian politicians 
was to maintain low interests in order to motivate investments. Thus, the government 
set the central bank rate, and they did so under the market rent. In consequence, they 
created an incentive to invest and not to save money. In order to stabilize the financial 
market they were, thus, forced to set up credit restrictions. 
 During the international neo-liberalistic wave, as an answer to the shortcomings 
of the regulated economy, from the late 1970s, Norway deregulated its credit market. 
However, still the parliamentary majority cling to politically decided central bank 
rents, under the market rent. Real interest rates after tax were negative. This in term 
created a greater credit boom in Norway than in most other countries during the boom 
of the 1980s.48 At the same time oil prices were at record peak levels and the inflow 
of capital to Norway was considerable.49 The money stock (M2) increased by 66 per 
cent from December 1981 until December 1985, and a rapid growth continued for 
                                                 
45 Grytten, Ola H. and Camilla Brautaset, “Family households and unemployment in Norway during 
years of crisis: new estimates 1926-1939, The History of the Family, vol 5, No. 1, 23-53.  
46 Knutsen, Sverre and Gunnhild Ecklund, Vern mot kriser: norsk finanstilsyn gjennom 100 år, 
Fagbokforlaget, Bergen 2000, 85-136. 
47 Klovland, Jan T., “Monetary policy and business cycles in the interwar years: the Scandinavian 
experience”, European Review of Economic History, vol. 2, No. 3, 1998, 309-344. 
48 Søilen, Espen, Hvorfor gikk det galt?: statens rolle i utviklingen av norsk næringsliv etter 1945, 
Gyldendal, Oslo 2002, 181-223. 
49 Knutsen, Sverre and Gunnhild Ecklund, Vern mot kriser, 225-268. 
 21
more than a year. Credit granted by banks increased by 164 per cent from 1983 until 
1987.50 The consequences of this development were not only a boom, but also over 
heating of the economy and asset bubbles. From 1980 till 1987 house prices in 
Norway stepped up by 211 per cent.51 Stock prices at Oslo Stock Exchange were 405 
per cent higher in September 1987 than in December 1980.52 
 In December 1985 oil prices started to fall dramatically after levels around 35-
40 US-dollars per barrel since 1979. In 1986 oil prices came under nine US-dollars 
per barrel. In consequence, Norwegian foreign trade went from high surpluses to 
devastating deficits. The government had to tighten up its budgetary policy. During 
May 1986 Norway saw both a governmental crisis, significant reductions in her 
budgets and a devaluation of twelve percent of the krone. Inflationary economic 
policy was substituted for both tight fiscal and monetary policy. October 19th 1987 
the Dow Jones index in New York fell by 22.6 per cent. The following day the main 
stock index at Oslo Exchange fell by 20 per cent.53  
 Norwegian banks had expanded rapidly both on the domestic and the 
international arena during the liberalization of the credit markets in the 1980s. In 
order to stay abroad Norwegian banks had to find customers. So they did: marginal 
customers native banks did not want to do business with. Losses were severe, 
particularly after the international business cycle turned in 1987/1988. In addition 
Norwegian banks had losses in a segment where they hadn’t lost any money of any 
significance since the Kristiania crisis, i.e. the real estate market. As the bad years 
approached the economy the government ran tight fiscal and monetary policies. 
Unemployment rose to heights comparable with those of the interwar period. Nominal 
house prices shrunk more than 30 percent 1987-1992, when nominal prices fell 
between 43 and 44 per cent. Norway experienced its worst real estate crash ever 
recorded. GDP stagnated and investments fell by 21.7 per cent.54  
 The crisis hit harder in Norway and the Nordic countries than in most western 
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economies. It became the longest and most severe financial crisis in Norway since the 
1930s and the worst banking crisis since the 1920s. When commercial banks typically 
lost 0.3-0.4 percent of their loans in the early 1980s, they lost 5.8 percent in 1991. 
Savings banks typically lost 0.2 per cent in the early 1980s and 2.7 per cent in 1989.55 
The state had to intervene in the credit market. Two of the three largest commercial 
banks were taken over by the state in 1991 and the latter of the three in 1993.  
 
The present financial crisis  
The present crisis is the worst global financial meltdown in peacetime since the 
1930s, with stock market crashes, real estate market crashes, credit crisis and a 
strongly negative business cycle. However, the impact on the Norwegian economy 
has so far been limited, except for the stock market.  
 The combination of credit market innovations and inflation targeting with low 
inflation, led to financial instability through low interest rates and a rapid increase in 
credits worldwide. From autumn 1992 until autumn 2008 the Norwegian credit 
volume (C2) almost quadrupled. Hence, asset bubbles came to being. Assets were 
financed by continuously more generous loans, and the sub-prime concept of the 
market was included in these arrangements.56 From January 2003 till July 2007 the 
Main stock index at the Oslo Exchange showed an annual growth rate of 45 percent. 
House prices had an annual growth rate of close to 12.5 per cent from January 1993 
until August 2007, when inflation ceased to less than two per cent annually in parts of 
the first decade in the 2000s. This means that nominal house prices were close to five 
times higher, when real prices were three times higher in July 2007 than in January 
1993.57 In fact, Norwegian house prices increased more than those for most other 
countries in the world, and twice as much as in the US 1993-2007.58 
 The housing bubble in the US was to a large degree financed by investment 
banks buying loan portfolios from ordinary banks. These were funded by loans to 
American investment banks in the international money markets. The risk was 
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considered limited since house prices grew almost continuously.59 However, when the 
markets turned, the investment banks ran into a liquidity crisis. In 2008 all the big 
investment banks in the US failed. Bank losses rocketed in the international arena, 
and important European, Asian and Latin-American banks had to seek protection or 
give up.60 Money market rents showed a steep increase.  
 During the autumn of 2008 credit markets ceased to work, and they had to be 
rescued by liberal central bank and government measures and guarantees. By this 
action, the world economy was rescued from a severe liquidity crisis. However, stock 
market crashed rapidly and real estate prices collapsed. The Dow Jones index 
contracted with 43 percent from January 2008 till the end of November the same year. 
In Norway the stock market collapsed with 64 percent in six months from May 22nd 
till November 20th 2008. This made the stock market crash the fastest and second 
biggest recorded in Norway ever, only inferior to the crash 1919-1921, with a fall off 
73.6 per cent on monthly data. Thus, the stock market crash was larger in Norway 
than in most other countries, but of course far less than in Iceland were stocks crashed 
with 76 per cent during one day. 
 House prices started to fall dramatically in most countries in 2007. In the US the 
fall has been recorded to about 40 per cent. Spain, Ireland and Denmark have seen 
comparable crashes. In the Baltics the real estate markets have collapsed even more. 
As for Norway, a fall in nominal house prices of 14 percent, were recorded from 
August 2007 till December 2008. During the same period the fall in real house prices 
were recorded to 18 per cent. However, due to rapid cancellations of new buildings, 
fewer units for sale and very low interest rates initiated by central banks world wide 
in late 2008, the Norwegian crash stopped in January 2009.61 
 GDP contracted between two and 16 percent in most capitalist economies in 
2009. Norway has so far definitely been a winner with an annual stagnation of about 
one percent and substantially lower unemployment rates than almost any comparable 
economy, with a little more than three percent unemployment in 2009. Bank losses 
have also been very limited in Norway so far.  
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Monetary expansion and crises  
As previously shown, both Minsky and Kindleberger argue that financial crisis often 
follows after booms and over heating, and financial bubbles in the economy. They 
also argue that these are fuelled by monetary expansion, where growth in credits 
seems to be the major force.62 Thus, it is of importance to check if there is a clear link 
between monetary and credit expansion on the one side and booms and busts on the 
other side. In order to find such a relationship in Norwegian economic history we look 
at historical time series for the money stock, bank loans, house prices and output gaps.  
 Again we use data from the Historical Monetary Statistics-project. The series 
of money stock and bank loans are constructed by Jan Tore Klovland. Output gaps are 
constructed as cycles from the HP-filtered GDP-series. Again we use the figures by 
Ola H. Grytten. The house price index, a repited sales-index, is constructed by Øyvind 
Eitrheim and Solveig K. Erlandsen.63 The data for the series are taken from bank 
accounts, private archives, newspapers, public registration offices, and records from 
Statistics Norway. For money stock, bank loans and house prices we use first order 
differentials on annual data. Nominal house prices are made real by deflating them 
with a historical consumer price index (CPI), constructed, by Ola H. Grytten.64  
 Chart 4 reports relative changes in the money stock, bank loans and real house 
prices from 1850 until 2008, calculated as logs (logt-logt-1). The three graphs are 
presented as five-year symmetric smoothed averages. It shows rapid increase in both 
money stock and bank loans prior to the Crimean financial crisis. When the growth in 
both variables contracted significantly during the crisis. House price inflation first 
rose under credit and monetary expansion, and thereafter contracted substantially 
during the financial bust from 1857 onwards. Again house prices showed a rapid 
increase during the money and credit expansion in the first part of the 1870s, to come 
significantly down when the two letter showed considerably lower growth rates from 
the late 1870s and in the 1880s. Previous to the house market crash during the 
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Kristiania Crisis 1899-1905 we also find money and credit booms alongside a 
substantial increase in real house prices.65 
 
Chart 4. Relative first order differentials of real house prices, bank loans and money 
stock (M2) for Norway 1830-2008. Five-year symmetric moving-averages. 
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Source, URL: http://www.norges-bank.no/templates/article____42332.aspx 
 
Real house prices also rose dramatically with some lag the credit and monetary boom 
1914-1920. Thereafter, nominal house prices contracted with almost one fifth 1920-
1927. However, the general deflation was even stronger. Thus, real house prices 
continued their climb until 1929. The credit and money expansion was also 
considerable in the 1980s. Again, house prices followed with some lag. Under the 
financial in the late 1980s and early 1990s, both nominal and real house prices 
collapsed 1987-1992. Finally we find 15 years of rapid growth in both bank loans and 
money stock along with an almost continuous growth in real house prices for the 
period 1993-2007. In real terms this was the longest and strongest period of growth in 
credits, money stock and real estate prices ever recorded for Norway. Then, from 
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August 2007 until the end of December 2008, house prices fell steeply with 14 
percent in nominal terms and 18 percent in real terms.66 
 
Chart 5. Output gap and relative first order differentials of bank loans and money 
stock (M2) for Norway 1830-2008. Five-year symmetric moving-averages. 
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Chart 5 also reveals that over expansion and recessions during financial crises in 
Norway tend to follow credit expansion and stagnation. This applies for the 1848-
crisis, the Crimean crisis from 1857, the long depression in the 1870s and 1880s, the 
Kristinaia crisis 1899-1905, the post-war depression in the 1920, the banking crisis 
1987-1993 and the current financial turmoil from 2007 and onwards.  
 We also know that there was huge monetary expansion and chaos previous to 
the troubled financial years 1816-1842, with signs of uncontrolled inflation and 
currency depreciation.67 However, we do not find this pattern for the great depression 
of the 1930s in Norway. Nevertheless, we clearly find it internationally, in particular 
in North America and France.68 Hence, again both the boom and the bust seem at least 
                                                 
66 Econ, Eiendomsmeglerbransjens boligprisstatistikk, NEF/EMFF, Oslo November 2009. 
67 Keilhau, Wilhelm, Den norske pengehistorie, Aschehoug, Oslo 1952, 48-61. 
68 Eichengreen, Barry, Elusive stability: Essays in the history of international finance 
1919-1939, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 24-82. 
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partly to be caused by over expansion in granted credits and money stock. Along with 
devastating financial international instability, where some countries maintained a 
substantial current account surplus, when others maintained persistent deficits, this 
led to a global melt down. The global crisis also influenced the small open Norwegian 
economy. However, due to better internal financial stability than in most other 
countries and an early abandonment of the gold standard, the crisis was milder in 
Norway than in most other countries. 
  
Chart 6. Main index Oslo Stock Exchange. First differentials (logs) on monthly data. 
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In chart 6 we have plotted monthly changes in the main index at Oslo Stock 
Exchange. As one can see the downturn during the first stock market crash  from late 
1918 until the early 1920s was a kind of a long slide downwards, when both the 
crashes in 1987 and 2008 were rapid collapses.   
 In order to make the trends clearer we have HP-filtered the monthly data with 
the standard λ-value of 14,400. This picture is drawn in chart 7. By using this 
smoothing parameter we clearly trace the boom of stock prices during the credit and 
money expansion from 1914 onwards, and thereafter the largest stock market crash 
ever recorded in Norway from August 1918 until February 1922.  
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 We also find significant growth in stock prices along with considerable credit 
and money expansion in the 1980s before a new double crash in September to 
December 1987 and July 1990 to September 1992, and in front of the 2008 crash.  
 
Chart 7. HP-filtered main index Oslo Stock Exchange. First differentials (logs) on 
monthly data. λ=14,400. 
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Hence, we find that the Minsky-Kindleberger argument, i.e. that financial crises and 
crashes historically tend to occur after liberalization in the credit markets, leading to 
financial instability and over expansion. The one exception for Norway seems to be 
the 1930-crisis, as far as there was no credit or monetary expansion in Norway during 
the years prior to the 1930s. However, Norway was special in this incident. On the 
international arena we certainly find credit liberalization and rapid growth in bank 
loans and the money stock in key economies of the world. The crisis was transmitted 
to the open Norwegian economy by international trade, currency transactions and the 
gold standard. 
 
Conclusions 
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The present seeks to throw light on key issues related to historical financial crisis in 
the small open economy of Norway. Experts on financial crises, like Hyman Minsky 
and Charles P. Kindleberger, both argue that major financial crises often have 
devastating effects on the real economy. They also stress that monetary expansion 
through credit liberalization and increased loaning activity cause financial booms and 
busts.  
 In this paper we try too analyze if these findings also apply to Norway. In 
order to do so we look at the chronology of business cycles and financial crises in 
Norway from she gained her independence from Danish rule in 1814 till present days. 
In the first place, we find that there were nine significant meltdowns in the peacetime 
real economy, which could be defined as economic crises. These coincide with the 
major peacetime financial crises in Norway. In conclusion, the real economy has 
contracted significantly during historical financial crises in Norway. Thereafter, we 
give a brief description and discussion of each of the nine financial downturns. 
Finally, we investigate if there typically was monetary expansion mirrored in 
significant increase of bank loans and money stock prior to financial meltdowns in 
Norway. 
 We conclude that output contracted during substantial financial crises and that 
domestically or international credit and money expansion fueled booms prior to all 
major financial crises in Norway from the early nineteenth century until present. 
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